准备把斯坦福哲学百科全书读一遍，开个贴当记录
用了人工智能这些文章就相对容易读了，前面几个条目我看过了，第一次标记Himelright, Jack, 2023, “A Lewisian Argument Against Platonism, or Why Theses About Abstract Objects Are Unintelligible,” Erkenntnis, 88(7): 3037–3057. doi:10.1007/s10670-021-00489-4.x
出自：https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/ However, there are deflationist proposals that run counter to Carnap’s approach, among them, deflationary nominalism (Azzouni 2010) or agnosticism about abstract objects (Bueno 2008a, 2008b, 2020). Additionally, philosophers inspired by Frege’s work have argued for a minimal notion of an object (Rayo 2013, Rayo 2020 ; and Linnebo 2018). For additional discussion about the basic positions in the debate about abstract and concrete objects, see Szabó 2003 For example, Benacerraf concluded that “numbers are not objects at all, because in giving the properties (that is, necessary and sufficient) of numbers you merely characterize an abstract structure—and the distinction lies in the fact that the ‘elements’ of the structure have no properties other than those relating them to other ‘elements’ of the same structure” (1965, 70). Though attempts have been made to investigate abstraction principles for sets (Cook 2003), it remains an open question whether something like the mathematical concept of a set can be characterized by a suitably restricted abstraction principle. (See Burgess 2005 for a survey of recent efforts in this direction.) For the relevant notion of essence, see Fine 1994. See Swoyer 2007 and Cowling 2017 for further discussion of abstract and concrete entities. See Dumsday 2022 for reasons to doubt not only the exhaustive but also the (disjunctively) exclusive character of the distinction). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/action/notes.html#note-1
Our focus will be on individual human action. Readers interested in joint action should consult Roth (2017) and Schweikard and Schmid (2021). We similarly defer on the topic of free will to O’Connor and Franklin (2022). surprising scientific results continue to challenge commonly held views in philosophy of action (see e.g. Wegner 2002 and Nahmias 2014 for critical discussion of recent findings). For more on these different approaches to intention, see Setiya 2022. Another disagreement is about whether a unique thing is a process and an event (at different times) (Steward 2012; Charles 2018), or whether the process and the event are distinct things (Stout 1997; Crowther 2011; Hornsby 2012; Charles 2015; Crowther 2018). For critical discussion, see Ford 2018.
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