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发表于 2025-11-18 18:07:11
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本帖最后由 横槊赋诗 于 2025-11-18 20:36 编辑
1.2 The ubiquity of abduction
The type of reasoning seen in the earlier examples is something many people find familiar. Both philosophers and psychologists agree that we often use abduction in everyday thinking. Sometimes, we clearly rely on abductive reasoning, but other times it happens so automatically that we don’t even notice it.
One example is how we trust what others say. This trust is thought to be based on abductive reasoning. For instance, Jonathan Adler (1994) suggests that when someone claims something is true, the best explanation for this is usually that they believe it for good reasons and want us to believe it too. Because of this, we generally have good reason to trust what they say.
This idea can also apply to how we understand language. Some argue that figuring out what a speaker means involves inferring the best explanation for why they said something in a certain context. In particular, experts in pragmatics have suggested that listeners use Gricean maxims—guidelines for conversation—to help determine the best explanation for a speaker's words when those words are unclear, overly detailed, off-topic, or otherwise strange.
In both cases, whether trusting testimony or understanding speech, the necessary abductive reasoning often happens below our conscious awareness.
Abductive reasoning isn’t just used in everyday situations; it's also important in scientific methods. Many philosophers of science argue that abduction is a key part of how science works. For example, Timothy Williamson (2007) claims that “the abductive methodology is the best science provides,” and Ernan McMullin (1992) describes abduction as “the inference that makes science.”
To show how abduction is used in science, we can look at two examples.
At the start of the nineteenth century, scientists noticed that Uranus, one of the seven known planets at the time, was not following the orbit predicted by Isaac Newton's theory of universal gravitation. Scientists also assumed there were no more planets in the solar system. One possible explanation for this deviation was that Newton's theory might be wrong. However, since Newton's theory had been very successful for over 200 years, this didn’t seem like a strong explanation.
Instead, two astronomers, John Couch Adams and Urbain Leverrier, proposed independently (but nearly at the same time) that there might be an eighth planet that hadn’t been discovered yet. They believed this idea offered the best explanation for Uranus’ unusual orbit. Soon after, this unknown planet was discovered and named "Neptune."
The second example is about the discovery of the electron by English physicist Joseph John Thomson. Thomson did experiments on cathode rays to find out if they were streams of charged particles. He reasoned this way:
Since cathode rays carry a negative charge, are deflected by electric forces as if they are negatively charged, and respond to magnetic forces like a negatively charged object would, I can only conclude that they are negatively charged particles.
Thomson's conclusion that cathode rays are made up of negatively charged particles doesn’t logically follow from his experimental results, nor did he have any relevant statistical data to support it. However, he felt there was no other reasonable explanation for his results, which suggests that he believed this conclusion was the best—and possibly the only—plausible explanation he could come up with.
There are many other examples of how abduction is used in science, as discussed in various studies and literature. For instance, some researchers like Harré, Lipton, Campanero, Aizawa, Headley, and Dellsén have explored this topic.
Abduction is also considered the main way doctors reason during medical diagnoses. Physicians typically choose the hypothesis that best explains a patient's symptoms. Various sources highlight this, including Josephson and Josephson's work on medical reasoning, as well as studies by Dragulinescu and Kind that focus on abduction in medicine and psychiatry.
Finally, abduction plays a crucial role in important philosophical debates. For example, Shalkowski discusses its place in metaphysics, and other scholars like Bigelow, Biggs and Wilson, and Schurz also explore this topic. Krzyżanowska, Wenmackers, and Douven examine how abduction might relate to the meanings of conditionals, while Williamson and Baron look at its applications in logic.
However, abduction is perhaps most significant in epistemology (the study of knowledge) and the philosophy of science, where it is often used to counter underdetermination arguments. These arguments start with the idea that several hypotheses can be equally valid based on empirical evidence, meaning that no evidence can favor one hypothesis over another. This leads to the conclusion that we cannot be justified in believing any specific hypothesis.
A well-known example of such an argument is the Cartesian argument for global skepticism. This argument suggests that our belief in reality as we perceive it is just as plausible as various skeptical scenarios, such as being deceived by an evil demon or being brains in vats connected to supercomputers. Similar reasoning has been applied to support scientific antirealism, which claims that we can't justifiably choose between different competing theories about what lies beneath observable reality.
Responses to these arguments usually highlight that the idea of empirical equivalence overlooks important explanatory aspects. This notion is often defined just by whether hypotheses make the same predictions. Critics argue that even if some hypotheses predict the same outcomes, one might still offer a better explanation for those outcomes.
If explanatory considerations matter in deciding which conclusions we can justifiably draw—according to supporters of abduction—they argue that we could be justified in believing one of several hypotheses that all make the same predictions.
Many epistemologists, following Bertrand Russell, have used abduction to counter Cartesian skepticism. They claim that although skeptical hypotheses make the same predictions as the hypothesis that reality is as we typically perceive it, they are not equally good explanations. Specifically, the skeptical hypotheses are considered much less simple than the "ordinary world" hypothesis. Various scholars, including Harman, Goldman, Moser, and Vogel, have made similar points, with Carter discussing this further. Pargetter has also offered an abductive response to skepticism about other minds.
Philosophers of science have similarly argued that we are justified in believing in Special Relativity Theory rather than Lorentz's version of the æther theory. Although both theories make the same predictions, Special Relativity is seen as a better explanation because it is ontologically simpler—it does not require the existence of an æther. Janssen provides a thorough discussion on why many philosophers prefer Einstein's theory over Lorentz's. |
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